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Abstract
With the advent of large-scale cloud computing infrastructure, network
extension and migration has emerged as a major challenge in the manage-
ment of modern enterprise networks. Many enterprises are considering ex-
tending or relocating their network components, in whole or in part, to re-
mote, private and public data centers, in order to attain scalability, failure
resilience, and cost savings for their network applications. In this paper, we
conduct a first rigorous study on the extension and migration of an enter-
prise network while preserving its performance and security requirements,
such as layer 2/layer 3 reachability, and middle-box traversal through load
balancer, intrusion detection and ACLs. We formulate this increasingly im-
portant problem, present preliminary designs, and conduct experiments to
validate the feasibility of our designs.
1 Introduction
Due to enterprise dynamics (e.g., expansion into a new site), hardware consolida-
tion, and the emergence of cloud computing infrastructures, network extension and
migration has become a major challenge in the management of modern enterprise
networks. On the one hand, as many enterprises run out of space in their exist-
ing data centers [7], they need to extend or relocate their network to new private
data centers. On the other hand, recent emergence of public cloud computing in-
frastructure provides enormous opportunities for an enterprise to either replace or
complement its existing servers with computing resources in the cloud, in order to
take advantage of improved efficiency and reliability. We refer to the private or
public data centers that an enterprise extends to as the remote data centers.
Despite their potential business benefits and needs, such extension and migra-
tion can become quite complex and pose substantial challenges to the operation of
enterprise network infrastructure. In particular, such extensions often have to be
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incremental instead of a complete restructuring of the existing network infrastruc-
ture. Thus, a seemingly small extension can be extremely challenging to handle in
practice.
Consider a simple example of relocating a set of application servers from one
data center of the enterprise to a remote data center (e.g., another private or public
cloud data center). These servers usually have complex communication patterns
regulated by network policies such as traversal of firewalls and intrusion detection
systems before being reached. Furthermore, an enterprise network may enforce
network policies using a variety of techniques including routing design, topology
design, and deployment of policy boxes at strategic locations. Some such tech-
niques, such as deployment at topology cuts, can be implicit without any explicit
representation. Consequently, it can be extremely challenging to take these servers
out of their current “context” and place them into another “context” while preserv-
ing existing network policies. Manual reconfiguration, although maybe feasible
for small networks, can no longer satisfy the need to scalable to large systems.
There are two common ways to connect an enterprise network to a remote data
center. In one extreme, a remote data center may belong to the same enterprise,
allowing plenty of flexibility in constructing network topology and policy boxes
inside the remote data center. In the other extreme, a remote data center may belong
to a public cloud provider, imposing substantial restrictions on the connection and
layout of the remote data center.
We present Mosaic, a first framework for network extension and migration
while preserving enterprise network policies. Mosaic introduces two key notions
— way-points and scopes — to capture network policy constraints during net-
work extension. Moreover, Mosaic includes two simple and yet powerful prim-
itives named proxy and mirror to implement network extensions with provable
guarantees. Guided by the policy contraints and utilizing the primitives, a Mosaic
extension algorithm computes efficient network extension strategy. We refer to
policy-preserving network extension as policy homomorphic network extension.
We proceed by presenting a rigorous analysis of the requirements and con-
straints of preserving policies during migration. We then evaluate our novel net-
work extension algorithm in a large campus network setting. Our preliminary
results indicate that Mosaic extension algorithm performs far better than a naive
server relocation algorithm in terms of number of policy violations.
2 Motivating Example
We start with a motivating example for the consolidation of resources into either a
private data center or a public data center such as Amazon’s EC2. Figure 1 shows
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Figure 1: Motivating example.
part of a real network. The network is a relatively standard three-tiered design,
hosting multiple applications of the organization. The figure removes the exact
model numbers of the devices. For reliability, each logical network device (e.g.,
firewall Fi, load balancer LBi, intrusion prevention system IPSi, and switch S j,
i = 1,2, j = 1, · · · ,5) represents two identical physical devices. One is active, and
the other standby. To make the figure easy to read, we draw only one such device.
Note that LB1,LB2 and CE are layer 3 (L3) devices; servers are endpoints; and the
rest are layer 2 (L2) devices.
Specifically, the tier-1 servers are the front ends of multiple network applica-
tions. The tier-1 servers of a given application are configured to belong to an IP
subnet with private IP addresses. Each application is also assigned a public IP ad-
dress to allow external access. Public IP addresses are assigned to the two load
balancers represented by LB1. A given application uses one load balancer as the
primary and the other as the standby.
The tier-1 servers communicate with the tier-2 servers, which are located be-
hind the two load balancers represented by LB2. The tier-2 servers and LB2 are
configured with private IP addresses for security protection. LB1 are configured
with static routes to reach LB2. The network border gateway CE has no knowledge
about the routes to the tier-2 servers.
3
Figure 2: Problem with L2 extension.
Let us consider the possibility of relocating the tier-1 servers to a public cloud
such as Amazon’s EC2. One might consider this a trivial task. Specifically, after
relocating the tier-1 servers to EC2, the operator simply updates LB1 with the new
IP addresses, if the IP addresses have to change. However, this simple solution can
be broken in multiple aspects:
• Violation of security policies: The tier-1 servers are configured with multiple
subnets, and the two boxes represented by IPS1 monitor cross-subnet traffic.
By simply relocating the tier-1 servers without relocating IPS1, the solution by-
passes the protection provided by IPS1, violating the security policies of the
organization.
• Broken client TCP sessions: Consider that an Internet client establishes a con-
nection with a public IP address of LB1. The load balancer directs the request
from the client to one of the relocated tier-1 servers. The tier-1 server processes
the request and sends back a reply, with the client’s address as the destination
and the server’s address as the source. However, the client is expecting a reply
with a source IP address of the load balancer, not the server. This breaks the
client TCP session.
• Disconnection from Tier-2 servers: Recall that only LB1 have routes to the tier-2
servers. Thus, when packets sent by the relocated tier-1 servers to tier-2 reach
CE (the customer gateway), say via an Amazon VPC tunnel, CE will drop these
packets because it does not know how to forward them.
In light of these issues, one may think they can be addressed by L2 exten-
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sions [2]. L2 extensions enable a LAN to be extended to a remote site. L2 exten-
sions reduce network and application changes needed to support live server migra-
tion. Previous work has focused on transparency in terms of L2 connectivity [2, 8].
However, the remote data center may not support L2 extension. Furthermore,
L2 extension still does not address policy homomorphism. In the preceding exam-
ple, consider the case of extending both VLAN 100 and VLAN 200 into a remote
data center. Because current public cloud infrastructure does not allow L2 exten-
sion, we focus on the case of extending to a private data center. Figure 2 zooms in
on the left portion of Figure 1.
Assume that an L2 extension link is created between S5 and S7 and VLAN
100 and VLAN 200 are logically connected to S7 in the remote data center. When
a server v3 in VLAN 100 communicates with u3 in VLAN 200 in the enterprise
network, the packet traverses: v1 → S1 → R1 → S1 → IPS1 → S2 → u1. However,
when v′3 in VLAN 100 communicates with u′3 in VLAN 200 in the private data
center, it will not go through IPS3; similarly the path from v3 to u′3 will not traverse
IPS3. Thus, L2 extension will not satisfy policy constraints automatically.
3 Mosaic Overview
The motivating example reveals potential issues facing the extension of an enter-
prise network into a remote data center. Mosaic is a systematic framework to ad-
dress these issues. Mosaic consists of two major components: policy specification
and network transformation.
Policy specification: To systematically investigate and solve the problems raised
in the preceding section, we need to explicitly define the policies that an enterprise
network intends to enforce so that one can validate any given solution. Policies
capture the “invariants” that network extension should preserve. Since network ex-
tension alters an existing network topology (e.g., by adding new nodes or relocating
existing nodes), the traversal and scope of a packet (or frame if we talk about layer
2) can deviate from those in the original network. Thus, policy specification is
crucial for policy enforcement, which will be discussed in Section 4.
Network transformation: Bounded by policy specification, network transforma-
tion computes the configuration at the remote data centers as well as at the local
enterprise network. In addition to policies, multiple other factors, including objec-
tives and constraints on application performance and migration costs, contribute to
the complexity and effectiveness of network transformation.
The capabilities of network devices influence what transformation techniques
may be used. In this paper, we do not assume the availability of futuristic mech-
anisms such as pswitches [5] and OpenFlow [6]. While these mechanisms can
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simplify our solutions, they have not been widely adopted so far. Instead, we only
consider the traditional mechanisms that are readily available in today’s enterprise
networks. In Section 5, we will discuss the primitives and algorithmic framework
of Mosaic.
4 Policy Specification
We start with the policy specification. We represent the topology of the original
enterprise network G using V , the set of nodes consisting of end hosts (servers,
virtual machines), switches, routers and middleboxes; and E , the set of connections
among network nodes.
An enterprise network operator defines policies P on packets and frames, based
on topology, as we have seen in the motivating example. Since we treat L3 pack-
ets and L2 frames uniformly in our framework, we use packet as a general term.
For a given packet, policies specify additional information beyond what is already
contained in the packet. Specifically, for a given packet pkti, policy Policyi con-
sists of not only destination(s) Destinationi but also two additional perspectives:
waypoints Waypointsi and scope Scopei.
By default, packets not associated with any policy are unwanted. These packets
must be filtered before reaching their destinations. This default policy captures un-
reachability policies which are typically enforced by limiting route redistributions
and specifying access control lists (ACLs) in routers.
Waypoints: The waypoints of a packet are the network nodes in addition to the
destination(s) that should receive the packet. An enterprise may design its network
such that a packet should pass through a particular set of network nodes. In the
motivating example, we see that packets from the Internet should visit an intrusion
prevention box before reaching a tier-1 server. As another example, an enterprise
network may deploy a sniffer that is connected to the mirror port of a switch to
receive a copy of a given packet for logging purpose. In this case, the sniffer also
belongs to the waypoints of the given packet. Let Waypointsi be the waypoints
of packet pkti.
Waypoints are specified by using the ordering and occurrence constraints. Or-
dering specifies if there are any constraints on the order to visit the nodes in the
waypoints. For example, an enterprise network may require a packet to visit one
middlebox before visiting another one. Occurrence specifies the number of times
that a middlebox should be visited. For example, a packet may visit a middle-
box only once, or none at all. We write Waypointsi(Orderi,Occurrencei) to
emphasize that Waypointsi requires the ordering and occurrence constraints for
pkti.
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It is important to realize that we use network nodes in a generic sense when
specifying waypoints. We can view each network node, in particular, a middlebox,
as the member of a function class (e.g., firewall, intrusion prevention, or sniffer)
with a specific configuration state. Formally, we denote the function class of the
middlebox node v j as class(vj); and its configuration state as conf(vj).
As an example, consider the network in Figure 1. The tier-1 and tier-2 fire-
walls have the same function class: class(F1) = class(F2) = Firewall. But
their configuration states are different: the tier-1 firewall is in charge of the first
line of defense and thus is configured to allow only HTTP traffic; the tier-2 fire-
wall handles traffic from the tier-1 servers and intranet and thus may allow more
protocols.
Scope: Destinations and waypoints capture the nodes that a packet must visit.
However, a packet may reach other nodes in an enterprise network. For example,
a modern switch may flood a given packet to a layer 2 domain if a forwarding
entry is not present in its layer 2 FIB (forwarding information base); routers and
switches along the path from the source to the destinations will see the packet (if
unencrypted); due to routing changes, some routers not on the normal forwarding
path may also see the packet. We associate a scope with each packet, which defines
the security zone of the packet. The scope is the maximum set of nodes that a
packet can reach. Let Scopei be the scope of pkti.
Example Policies: We now illustrate the preceding concepts using the example
shown in Figure 1. Figure 3 specifies six policies for the network.
Policy Policy1 specifies that any HTTP request packet pkt1 to a tier-1 applica-
tion server from an Internet client must traverse tier-1 firewall, tier1 load balancer
(the tier-1 application’s public accessible IP is configured at the load balancer LB1).
The packet’s destination is changed to a tier-1 server u1 by LB1. We treat this as
a new packet pkt2. This packet with source ue and destination u1 which originates
from L1 needs to traverse IPS1. The scope of pkt1 Scope1 = {LB1, F1,CE,S1,ue}.
The scope of pkt2 Scope2 = {LB1,IPS1,S3,u1}.
Policy Policy3 says that, any reply packet pkt3 from a tier-1 server to an In-
ternet client must be sent to the load balancer first. It should be checked by IPS1.
Policy Policy4 says that, for any packet pkt4 with source LB1 originating from
u1, destined to an Internet client needs no further checks. Scope3 = Scope2 and
Scope4 = Scope1.
Policy Policy5 states that a tier-1 server’s packet pkt5 must traverse tier-
2 firewall and load balancer LB2. The scope Scope5 = {u1,u2,F2,LB2,IPS2,
S1,S2,S3,S4, IPS1,LB1}.
Policy Policy6 states that cross-traffic between tier-1 servers in different sub-
net must be checked by IPS1. The scope Scope6 = {u1,v1,IPS1,S3}.
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// 1. Internet client ue to a tier-1 application
Policy1 = ([ue,L1,∗,80,TCP],Scope1,Waypoints1({F1LB1},
{σ|Ocurr(σ,F1) = 1,Ocurr(σ,LB1) = 1})
Policy2 = ([ue,u1,∗,80,TCP],Scope2,Waypoints2({IPS1},
{σ|Ocurr(σ,IPS1)> 0})
// 2. Tier-1 application server u1’s reply to Internet client ue
Policy3 = ([u1,ue,80,∗,TCP],Scope3,
{σ|Ocurr(σ,LB1) = 1,Ocurr(σ,IPS1)> 0})
Policy4 = ([u1,ue,80,∗,TCP],Scope4,Waypoints2({},{}))
// 3. Tier-1 application server u1 communicates with tier-2 server u2
Policy5 = ([u1,u2,∗,∗,TCP],Scope5,{F2LB2IPS2},
{σ|Ocurr(σ,F2) = 1,Ocurr(σ,LB2) = 1,Ocurr(σ,IPS2)> 0})
// 4. Tier-1 application server u1 in subnet 1 communicates with tier-1
// application server v1 in subnet 2
Policy6 = ([u1,v1,∗,∗,TCP],Scope6,Waypoints6({IPS2},
{σ|Ocurr(σ,IPS2)> 0})
Figure 3: Policies for enterprise network in Figure 1.
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5 Network Transformation
We consider network transformation algorithms that take as input an original net-
work, its policy specification, the set U of servers to be extended or relocated to
remote data centers, reconfiguration constraints at the local and remote data cen-
ters, the cost model of network equipment and traffic, and performance constraints
on applications. The set U can be manually given or computed by another algo-
rithm.
The outputs of network transformation include:
• the connecitvity from local data centers to remote data centers;
• the restructuring of the local data center, including addition and deletetion of
nodes, as well as reconfiguration of existing nodes;
• the configuration of the remote data centers.
Note that the capabilities supported at the remote data center can place substan-
tial constraints on the outputs of the network transformation algorithm. Consider
Amazon’s VPC as an example remote data center. VPC makes public cloud re-
sources appear the same as internal enterprise resources. However, VPC imposes
specific constraints on the connections from the enterprise network. First, VPC
specifies L3 connectivity. Second, inside VPC, the enterprise can construct only
a logical star topology connecting multiple subnets. On the other hand, a private
data center, for instance, a new data center owned by the same enterprise, may al-
low more flexibility. In this case, the remote data center may allow both L2 and L3
connectivity from the local enterprise network to the remote data center. Also, the
enterprise can have flexibility in constructing a topology and placing policy devices
inside the remote data center.
To be concrete, we present a two-stage transformation algorithm.
Stage 1: The algorithm computes, for each policy, whether to enforce it at the local
data center or the remote data center. The computation is based on the constraints
on application performance (e.g., delay constraints), enterprise costs (e.g., cross
data-center traffic and equipment replication cost), and the availability of policy
classes at the local and remote data centers.
Stage 2: The algorithm constructs detailed configurations at the local and remote
data centers.
Instead of going over all steps of the complete algorithm, we present three key
primitives used at Stage 2:
• Mosaic proxy: this primitive allows enforcement of a policy at the local data
center. The primitive is driven by the principle of least-disruption and greatest
re-use. It enforces a policy by traversing the original policy boxes in the local
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Figure 4: Mosaic proxy resolves policy violation of Fig 2.
data center. Thus, it has low equipmemnt cost. It avoids policy ommisions such
as those discussed at the end of Section 2.
• Mosaic mirror: this primitive enforces policies at the remote data center by repli-
cating a minimal set of policy boxes in the remote data center. The replicated set
is achieved by computing an edge-cut-set surrounding relocated nodes to ensure
robust policy enforcement even in the presence of failures. Enforcing policies at
the remote data center reduces latency, in particular, for traffic among relocated
servers.
• Mosaic policy relocaton: this primitive optimizes specific classes of policies
(e.g., firewall) by relocating them from one device to another existing network
device (e.g., as a different firewall context) to enforce policy without introducing
any new devices.
In this paper, we present more details only for the Mosaic proxy primitive,
which forces packets to traverse the original policy at the local data center.
Figure 4 illustrates the introducion of a Mosaic proxy to fix the problem of
policy violation using standard L2 extension, as shown in Figure 2. Let vtarget
denote the entrance to the remote data center. Mosaic proxy introduces a switch
Sproxy with L2 connectivity to vtarget . Since u3 and v3 will migrate to the remote
data center, Mosaic proxy connects their corresponding switches S5 and S6 to Sproxy
with VLAN configurations shown in the figure.
Now, consider the policy that communications between u′3 and v′3 be checked
by IPS1 in the network after migration. Specifically, since v′3 and u′3 are in different
subnets, a packet from one to the other will be routed to R1 in VLAN 100. In
particular, the path from v′3 to R1 is v′3 → vtarget → Sproxy → S3 → S5 → R1. The
path from R1 to u′3 in VLAN 200 is S5 → IPS1 → S6 → Sproxy → vtarget → u′3.
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Figure 5: Fraction of paths with policy violations without Mosaic.
Thus, any packet from v′3 to u′3 traverses the policy box IPS1, satisfying the policy
requirement.
Note that Sproxy does not have to be a new device. It can be any L2 switch that
can connect to Vtarget . The links connecting S5,S6 to Sproxy can be implemented
logically using private VLANs, in order to make sure that switches S5,S6 can talk
to only Sproxy, not between themselves.
6 Evaluation
We conduct preliminary evaluation on the effectiveness of Mosaic. Specifically, we
obtain router, middlebox and switch configuration files of a campus network with
more than 50 routers and more than 1000 switches. We extract route distribution
graph, and L3 topology using a tool in [1]. We then insert the L2 topology into L3
topology due to the fact that switch configurations are not adequate. We infer the
middlebox traversal policy based on the topology properties and route distribution
graph. We examine the possible paths between two endpoints (represented as two
subnets or two VLANs). From the path, we determine the middleboxes traversed
and store this sequence as the way-points for this particular path. For scope, if
both endpoints are in the same VLAN, then the scope is all nodes in the broadcast
domain. If they are not in the same VLAN, we use all reachable nodes (based on
route distribution graph and ACLs) in the security zone as the scope.
Figure 5 shows the results of no policy enforcement extension, when we pick
a set U of servers to relocate. The x-axis is the size of the set of servers to re-
locate. Specifically, the algorithm operates in the following way: Routes in the
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remote data center are advertised through BGP and are redistributed to the en-
terprise network. As such, the design is the most efficient solution in terms of
performance. However, it is not a viable option to enforce policy requirements due
to its volatile tendency to violate policy. We break the communication into three
types: UU sessions (among relocated servers), UL2domain (between relocated and
those remaining at the same L2 domain), and UExternal(between relocated and
those outside the campus network). We see that there can be significant policy vi-
olations. The UExternal policy violations can occur on as many as 80% of the
paths due to traversal of several security zones. Conversely, Mosaic sustains no
policy violations.
Although the no-policy-enforcement approach is not feasible in practice, it is a
baseline comparison for measuring the cost of enforcing policy. In the next exper-
iment, we evaluate the cost of enforcing policies by considering the average path
length for communication between points in relocated U and other endpoints in
the network. The path length is defined as the number of network devices a packet
must traverse from source to destination (i.e., network hops).
Figure 6 shows the results. The distances shown in these results only include
the enterprise portion and count both L2 and L3 hops. A tunnel hop is counted
by the number of hops it traverses. It is important to recall that Mosaic-Mirror
enforces policies remotely, whereas Mosaic-Proxy enforces locally. We observe
that the price of enforcing policies measured by hop counts may not be signifi-
cant, shown by the non-significant increase of hop counts compared with no policy
enforcement.
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7 Conclusion and future work
Network extension and migration are now a major challenge for large-scale net-
works, attracting industrial attention (e.g., [2, 4, 3, 8]). Ad-hoc methods of net-
work extension and migration can result in serious policy violations. In this paper,
we present the first framework for network policy specification. Furthermore, we
evaluate the feasibility of policy homomorphic network extension and migration to
remote data centers.
References
[1] T. Benson, A. Akella, and D. Maltz. Mining policies from enterprise network config-
uration. In IMC’09, 2009.
[2] Cisco Inc. Data center interconnect: Layer 2 extension between remote data centers.
[3] Cohesive Flexible Technologies Corp. VPN-Cubed: customer controlled security for
the cloud.
[4] Computer World. IBM, Juniper join in cloud strategy: Technology would reallocate
computing resources between private, public cloud, Feb. 2009.
[5] D. Joseph, A. Tavakoli, and I. Stoica. A policy-aware switching layer for data centers.
CCR, 2008.
[6] Openflow. The openflow switch specification.
[7] SearchDataCenter and Viridity. An expert guide to data center trends, energy regula-
tions, and more, 2010.
[8] T. Wood, A. Gerber, K. K. Ramakrishnan, and J. Van Der Merwe. The case for
enterprise-ready virtual private clouds. In USENIX HotCloud, June 2009.
13
This figure "yaleshield.jpg" is available in "jpg"
 format from:
http://arxiv.org/ps/1005.2393v1
